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Abstract
I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent￿ s
type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the
results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal
income-taxation. I ￿rst show, through a simple discrete example, that distortions need not
vanish over time and need not be monotonic in the shock to the buyer￿ s valuation. These
results are in contrast to those obtained in the literature that assumes a Markov process with
a binary state space￿ e.g. Battaglini, 2005. I then show that the study of the dynamics of the
optimal mechanism can be signi￿cantly simpli￿ed by assuming the shocks are independent over
time. When the sets of possible types in any two adjacent periods satisfy a certain overlapping
condition (which is always satis￿ed with a continuum of types) and some additional regularity
conditions hold, then the optimal mechanism is the same irrespective of whether the shocks are
the buyer￿ s private information or are observed also by the seller. These conditions are satis￿ed,
for example, in the case of an AR(1) process, a Brownian motion, but also when shocks have a
multiplicative e⁄ect as it is often the case in ￿nancial applications. Furthermore, the distortions
in the optimal quantities are independent of the distributions of the shocks and, when the buyer￿ s
payo⁄ is additively separable, they are also independent of whether the shocks are transitory or
permanent. Finally, I show that assuming the shocks are independent not only does it greatly
simplify the analysis, it is actually without loss of generality.
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11 Introduction
Long-term contracting plays an important role in a variety of situations including trade, employ-
ment, regulation, taxation, and ￿nancial contracting. Most long-term relationships take place in
a ￿changing world￿that is in an environment that evolves (stochastically) over time: the value a
buyer attaches to a good or a service, the production cost incurred by a seller, the productivity of
a worker, the return to a ￿nancial project, the parties￿outside options, are all likely to change over
time in response to shocks to the environment. These changes are often anticipated at the mo-
ment of contracting, albeit not necessarily jointly observed by the parties. By implication, optimal
long-term contracts must be ￿ exible to accommodate such changes and be designed in a way that
provides the parties with incentives to share the information they gradually learn over time.
Understanding the properties of optimal long-term contracts is important both from a positive
and a normative viewpoint. Unfortunately, the characterization of optimal long-term contracts
for stochastic environments can be tedious which possibly explains why the literature on optimal
dynamic contracts is relatively thin and most of the existing results established only for special
cases.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a convenient way of describing the evolution of the
environment which facilitates the characterization of optimal long-term contracts. I then use such a
characterization to address the following questions: What are the dynamics of the optimal decisions,
such as the supply of quantity/quality over time? When do distortions vanish in the long-run?
Under what conditions does it matter whether the ￿shocks￿(i.e. the changes to the environment)
are privately observed instead of being jointly observed by the parties? When is the nature of the
shocks (i.e. whether they are transitory or permanent) irrelevant for the dynamics of the optimal
decisions?
The model I consider stylizes a dynamic buyer-seller relationship. However, the techniques and
the results apply more generally to many other environments, including the applications mentioned
above.
In the ￿rst part of the paper, I use a simple example to argue that the results obtained in
the literature that assumes a Markov process with a binary state space￿ e.g. Battaglini, 2005
and Battaglini and Coate, 2007￿ need not extend to more general stochastic processes, such as a
Brownian motion, or an AR(1) process. In particular, I show that distortions need not vanish in
the long-run, can be larger in the future than in the present and need not be monotonic in the
shocks to the buyer￿ s valuation.
In the second part of the paper, I then consider environments in which the shocks are independent
over time (but where types are correlated!). Assuming independent shocks greatly simpli￿es the
analysis.I ￿rst consider the case where the buyer￿ s valuation (his type) follows a continuous process and
then the case of ￿nitely many types. In both cases, the approach I follow to characterize the optimal
mechanism is the following. First, I derive necessary conditions for incentive-compatibility that are
the analog in a dynamic setting of the familiar envelope conditions for static environments. Next, I
de￿ne a relaxed program that consists of maximizing the seller￿ s intertemporal expected payo⁄under
the sole constraints that the mechanism satisfy the necessary conditions for incentive-compatibility.
Thanks to the assumption of independent shocks, the solution to the relaxed program is extremely
simple and illuminative. Letting ￿1 denote the buyer￿ s type in period one, ￿t = (￿2;:::;￿t) the vector
of shocks experienced by the buyer up to period t; and vt(￿1;￿t) the buyer￿ s period-t valuation,
the dynamics of distortions in the optimal mechanism are governed entirely by the dynamics of
@vt(￿1;￿t)=@￿1; i.e. by the sensitivity of future valuations to the buyer￿ s initial type. In particular,
the dynamics of distortions are completely independent of the distributions of the shocks: For
example, when the agent￿ s valuation follows a random walk (or, in continuos time, a Brownian
motion), then ￿t = vt(￿1;￿t) = ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿t, in which case distortions are constant over time
and depend only on the hazard rate of the distribution of the buyer￿ s ￿rst-period valuation. In
contrast, in the case of an AR(1) process, ￿t = vt(￿1;￿t) = at￿t￿1 +￿t in which case distortions are
governed by the dynamics of
Q
at. If at = a for all t with a 2 (0;1); then distortions eventually
vanish over time, as predicted by Battaglini￿ s model. More generally, however, distortions need
not be monotonic neither in time nor in the magnitude of the shocks and need not vanish in the
long-run.
I also show that, when the optimal mechanism solves the relaxed program, then it has the
following properties: (i) the quantity schedules (as well as the players￿payo⁄s) coincide with the
ones the seller would o⁄er if the shocks were jointly observed by both parties; (ii) the seller may
￿nd it optimal to exclude a buyer for a few periods and then serve him again once his virtual
valuation has su¢ ciently improved; (iii) high-valuation buyers may receive smaller quantities than
low-valuation ones, as a function of how their valuations evolved over time; (iv) it is never optimal
for the seller to transfer the ownership of the production technology to the buyer. Once again all
these properties are in contrast to those that one obtains in a model with a binary type space.
Because the aforementioned properties refer to the solution to the relaxed program, it is im-
portant to understand under what conditions the latter coincides with the optimal mechanism. In
other words, when are the necessary conditions also su¢ cient? In static environments the answer
is know to rest upon the combination of two properties: the fact that the allocations are monotonic
in the agent￿ s type and the fact that the agent￿ s preferences satisfy the single-crossing property.
Unfortunately, in a dynamic setting, these properties alone do not guarantee that the solution to
the relaxed program is indeed incentive-compatible.
2The su¢ cient conditions I identify are the analog of those in Eso and Szentes (2007) adapted
to the multi-period-multi-decision setting considered here. These conditions are based on the
following two properties. That the process is Markov and that the quantity schedules satisfy a
strong monotonicity condition. This condition requires that, holding constant the evolution of the
buyer￿ s type up to period t ￿ 1 and the value of the buyer￿ s valuation from period t + 1 to period
s ￿ t + 1; the quantity supplied in period s be monotonic in the shock (equivalently, the buyer￿ s
type) in period t:
Following essentially the same reverse-engineering as in Eso and Szentes (2007), I then show
how one can back up the primitive conditions for the underlying stochastic process that guarantee
that the solution to the relaxed program satis￿es the strong monotonicity property. The advantage
of describing the evolution of the state (i.e. the buyer￿ s type) through a sequence of indepen-
dent innovations (as opposed to a sequence of conditional distributions, as it is standard in the
literature￿ e.g. Baron and Besanko, 1984, Courty and Li, 2000) stems also from the possibility of
identifying such su¢ cient conditions.
Next, I consider stochastic processes with ￿nitely-many types. In this case, the aforementioned
properties (Markov + strong monotonicity) do not su¢ ce for the optimal mechanism to coincide
with the solution to the relaxed program. If, however, in addition to these properties, a certain
overlapping condition holds which requires that the set of possible types in any two adjacent periods
overlap enough, then the same results established for the case with a continuum of types obtain:
the optimal mechanism coincides with the one the seller would o⁄er if the buyer could lie only once,
as it is the case with observable shocks.
The natural question to ask at this point is how restrictive is the assumption of independent
shocks? I show that any process in which the distribution of ￿t given (￿1;:::;￿t￿1) is continuous and
strictly increasing in ￿t can be represented through a collection of real valued functions vt and ran-
dom variables ￿t such that ￿t = vt(￿1;￿t) with (￿1;￿t) jointly independent. Assuming independent
shocks is thus without loss of generality in the case of a continuous process. The characterization
of the necessary conditions for incentive-compatibility and the corresponding solution to the re-
laxed program are thus general. On the other hand, the su¢ cient conditions described above also
require the process to be Markov, the functions vt(￿1;￿t) to be increasing in each argument, and
the quantity schedules that solve the relaxed program to be strongly monotonic. The monotonic-
ities of vt are always satis￿ed under ￿rst-order-stochastic-dominance. Strong monotonicity of the
schedules is satis￿ed when, in addition to the aforementioned properties, the distribution of the
agent￿ s type in period one is log-concave and the conditional distributions Ft(￿t;￿t￿1) are such that
[@Ft(￿t;￿t￿1)=@￿t￿1]=[ft(￿t;￿t￿1)] are increasing in both ￿t and ￿t￿1, a property that is satis￿ed by
many continuous processes. Assuming independent shocks is thus not only convenient, but actually
3less restrictive than one may think.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model. Section 3 illustrates,
by means of a simple (￿nite) example, why the results obtained with binary types need not extend
to more general stochastic processes. Section 4 contains all the results for independent shocks.
Finally, Section 5 discusses in what sense the assumption of independent shocks is not restrictive.
2 The environment
Consider a buyer-seller relationship that evolves over T 2 N periods. Both the buyer and the seller








where qt 2 R+ denotes the quantity received by the buyer in period t; ￿t the buyer￿ s period-t
valuation, pt the total price paid to the seller in period t, Ct(qt) the cost to produce and supply
qt; and ￿ > 0 the common discount factor. The function Ct : R+ ￿! R is strictly increasing and
convex with C0
t(0) = 0 and limq!1 C0
t(q) = +1; for all t:
The evolution of the buyer￿ s valuation is conveniently described through a collection of functions
vt : Rt ￿! R such that, for any t > 1;
￿t = vt(￿1;￿t)
where ￿1 denotes the buyer￿ s valuation in period one while ￿t ￿ (￿2;:::;￿t) denotes the vector of
"shocks" experienced by the buyer in the subsequent periods. Each function vt is equi-Lipschitz




is described by the c.d.f. ￿ with support ￿1￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿T: With an abuse
of terminology, I will hereafter refer to ￿t 2 ￿t as the buyer￿ s ￿type￿in period t; with
￿t ￿ f￿ 2 R : ￿ = vt(￿1;￿t); (￿1;￿t) 2 ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿tg:
To simplify the description of the distortions in the optimal contracts, and without any serious loss
of generality, hereafter I assume that Ct(q) = q2=2 for all t; in which case the ￿rst-best schedules
are given by
qFB
t (￿1;￿t) = vt(￿1;￿t) 8t and 8
￿
￿1;￿t￿
The sequence of events is the following.
4￿ At t = 0; the buyer privately learns ￿1.
￿ At t = 1; the seller o⁄ers a mechanism ’ = (M;￿). The latter consists of a collection of
mappings
￿t : M1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Mt ! R+￿R
that specify a price-quantity pair for each possible pro￿le of messages mt ￿ (m1;:::;mt) 2
M1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Mt, withM ￿ (M)
T
t=1 and ￿ ￿ (￿t)T
t=1. A mechanism is thus equivalent to a
menu of long-term contracts with memory.
If the buyer refuses to participate in ’, the game ends and both players obtain a payo⁄ equal
to zero. If the buyer accepts to participate in ’; he chooses a message m1 2 M1, receives a
quantity q1(m1), pays a transfer p1(m1); and the game moves to period 2.
￿ At t = 2, the buyer privately observes the shock ￿2. He then chooses whether to continue to
participate in ’ or ￿walk away￿from the relationship. If he walks away, the game ends and
both players￿continuation payo⁄s are zero. If he stays, he sends a new message m2 2 M2,
receives a new quantity q2(m1;m2), pays a transfer p2(m1;m2); and the game moves to period
3:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ At t = T + 1 the game is over.
Remark. The game described above corresponds to an environment with one-side commitment:
the seller can perfectly commit to her long-term mechanism, but the buyer can walk away from the
relationship at any point in time.
2.1 Incentive-compatibility
Because the seller can fully commit, the Revelation Principle1 applies and, by implication, the
pro￿t-maximizing mechanism can be characterized by restricting attention to direct mechanisms in
which the agent truthfully reveals his type ￿t at any point in time. Alternatively, one can restrict
attention to mechanisms in which the agent is asked to report his initial type ￿1 in period one and
the innovation ￿t at any subsequent period. Clearly, by virtue of the Revelation Principle, the two
approaches are equivalent. For reasons that will become clear from the subsequent exposition, I
￿nd the latter approach more convenient. In what follows, I thus consider direct mechanisms
￿t : ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t ! R+￿R
1See, among others, Gibbard (1977), Green and La⁄ont (1977) and Myerson (1979).
5in which the buyer reports at each period the innovation ￿t instead of his type ￿t.2 A direct
mechanism is incentive-compatible if, conditional on having reported truthfully in the past, the
buyer has the incentives to report truthfully in the present.3




denote the continuation payo⁄ for a































denote the buyer￿ s expected continuation payo⁄ from period t onward when he
reported truthfully in the past and plans to report truthfully in all subsequent periods (i.e. his












That is, a buyer who reported truthfully up to period t ￿ 1 and who experiences a shock ￿t in
period t; (weakly) prefers to report truthfully from period t onward rather than lying in period t
and then choosing optimally what to report at any subsequent date.
The two-period case. As an illustration, suppose T = 2. Because there is no risk of confusion,
I then drop the subscript for the shock in period two.
First, consider the buyer￿ s incentives at t = 2: Let
U2 (￿1;￿) ￿ v2(￿1;￿)q2(￿1;￿) ￿ p2(￿1;￿) (1)
denote the buyer￿ s continuation payo⁄ at t = 2 when he reported ￿1 truthfully at t = 1 and he














conveniently summarizes not only the buyer￿ s current valuation, ￿t;but the entire sequence of
past valuations, ￿
t ￿ (￿1;:::;￿t):
3One could also consider a stronger notion of incentive compatibility according to which the buyer has the incentives
to report truthfully in each period, regardless of whether he has reported truthfully in the past. Because of the
Revelation Principle, the two notions lead to the same optimal allocations. In fact, imposing incentive-compatibility
also o⁄-equilibrium is just a way of describing the best action for the buyer, given any possible history. As I show
below, such a complete description is however unnecessary to establish the results.
6denote the maximal continuation payo⁄ that the buyer can guarantee himself in the (sub)game
that starts at t = 2 when his true type in period one was ￿1, he reported ^ ￿1; and then experienced
a shock ￿ in period two. Incentive-compatibility at t = 2 requires that
U2 (￿1;￿) = ~ U2 (￿1;￿;￿1) 8 (￿1;￿): (2)
That is, conditional on having reported ￿1 truthfully in period one, the buyer ￿nds it optimal to
report ￿ truthfully in period two.
Next, consider the buyer￿ s incentives at t = 1: Let
U(￿1) ￿ ￿1q1(￿1) ￿ p1(￿1) + ￿E￿fU2 (￿1;￿) j ￿1g (3)
denote the buyer￿ s expected payo⁄ when his type is ￿1 and he plans to report truthfully in both
periods. Then let
~ U(￿1) ￿ max
^ ￿1
n






denote the maximal payo⁄that type ￿1 can obtain by choosing optimally his reports in each period.











A mechanism is thus incentive-compatible if and only if (4) holds for any ￿1 and (2) holds for any
(￿1;￿); equivalently, if and only if
U(￿1) = ~ U(￿1) 8￿1: (5)
3 A simple (￿nite) example
To illustrate the trade-o⁄s that determine the structure of the optimal mechanism in the simplest
possible way, consider the following environment in which T = 2; ￿1 ￿ f￿ ￿;￿g; ￿ > 0, ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ > 0,
and ￿ ￿ f￿l;￿m;￿hg, with ￿h > ￿m > ￿l. The probability the buyer is a high type (equivalently, the
proportion of high types in the the cross section of the population) is Pr(￿1 = ￿ ￿) = v. Conditional
on ￿1, the probability of a high shock is Pr(￿hj￿1) = x(￿1), the probability of an intermediate
shock is Pr(￿mj￿1) = ￿(￿1) and the probability of a low shock is Pr(￿lj￿1) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿1) ￿ x(￿1);
with ￿ x ￿ x(￿ ￿), ￿ ￿ = ￿(￿ ￿); ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) and x ￿ x(￿): For future reference, also let ￿￿ ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿m,
7￿￿ ￿ ￿m ￿ ￿l and ￿￿ ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿l: Finally, without loss of generality, assume that
￿2 = v2(￿1;￿2) = ￿1 + ￿2:
This simple environment su¢ ces to illustrate the logic of the results; as I show below, it also nests
Battaglini (2005) as a special case thus permitting us to illustrate what drives the results in his
paper and why they need not extend to more general processes.
In this environment, incentive-compatibility at t = 2 requires that
U2 (￿1;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿m) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿m) (6)
U2 (￿1;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿l) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿l) (7)
U2 (￿1;￿m) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿l) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿l) (8)
U2 (￿1;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿m) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿h) (9)
U2 (￿1;￿m) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿l) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿m) (10)
U2 (￿1;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿l) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿h) (11)
both for ￿1 = ￿ ￿ and for ￿1 = ￿: From (6)-(11) one can immediately see that a necessary con-
dition for incentive-compatibility at t = 2 is the familiar monotonicity condition according to
which q2 (￿1;￿) is nondecreasing in ￿: The following lemma further simplify the characterization of
incentive-compatibility.
Lemma 1 Take any pair of types ￿00
2 = v2(￿1;￿00) and ￿0
2 = v2(￿1;￿0); with ￿00
2 > ￿0
2 and suppose
that the period-2 contracts for these two types ￿2(￿1;￿00) ￿ (q2(￿1;￿00);p2(￿1;￿00)) and ￿2(￿1;￿0) ￿
(q2(￿1;￿0);p2(￿1;￿0)); with ￿2(￿1;￿00) 6= ￿2(￿1;￿0), are designed in an incentive-compatible way, in
the sense that
￿00
2q2(￿1;￿00) ￿ p2(￿1;￿00) ￿ ￿00
2q2(￿1;￿0) ￿ p2(￿1;￿0) (12)
￿0
2q2(￿1;￿0) ￿ p2(￿1;￿0) ￿ ￿0
2q2(￿1;￿00) ￿ p2(￿1;￿00): (13)
Then,
(i) Any type ￿2 > ￿00
2 strictly prefers the contract ￿2(￿1;￿00) to the contract ￿2(￿1;￿0):
(ii) Any type ￿2 < ￿0
2 strictly prefers the contract ￿2(￿1;￿0) to the contract ￿2(￿1;￿00):
(iii) Any type ￿2 2 (￿0
2;￿00
2) strictly prefers the contract ￿2(￿1;￿0) to the contract ￿2(￿1;￿00) if
(12) binds and ￿2(￿1;￿00) to ￿2(￿1;￿0) if (13) binds.
Lemma 1 follows directly from the fact that the function g(￿;q) ￿ ￿ ￿ q satis￿es the single
crossing property and thus has strictly increasing di⁄erences. An immediate implication of Lemma
81 is that, when the adjacent downstream local incentive-compatibility constraints (6) and (8) bind
(or, alternatively, when the adjacent upstream constraints (9) and (10) bind) and q2 (￿1;￿) is
monotonic in ￿, then all remaining constraints for t = 2 are satis￿ed. Lemma 1 also permits us to
characterize the behavior of the buyer in period two when he misreported his type in period one.
Consider the payo⁄ that ￿ ￿ expects from lying at t = 1 and then reporting ￿ truthfully at t = 2.
The following is then a necessary condition for incentive-compatibility at t = 1:
U(￿) ￿ U(￿) + ￿￿q1(￿) + ￿f￿ x[U2(￿;￿h) + ￿￿q2(￿;￿h)] + ￿[U2(￿;￿m) + ￿￿q2(￿;￿m)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x)[U2(￿;￿l) + ￿￿q2(￿;￿l)]
￿ xU2(￿;￿h) ￿ ￿U2(￿;￿m) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x)U2(￿;￿l)g
(14)
Condition (14) can be conveniently rewritten as
U(￿) ￿ U(￿) + ￿￿q1(￿) + ￿f(x ￿ x)[U2(￿;￿h) ￿ U2(￿;￿m)]
+ (￿ x + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ x)[U2(￿;￿m) ￿ U2(￿;￿l)] + x￿￿q2(￿;￿h)
+ ￿￿￿q2(￿;￿m) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x)￿￿q2(￿;￿l)g
(15)
Now suppose that shocks are su¢ ciently ￿large￿ in the sense that ￿￿ ￿ minf￿￿;￿￿g; so that
￿ ￿ + ￿l ￿ ￿ + ￿m and ￿ ￿ + ￿m ￿ ￿ + ￿h and that the distribution of ￿2 given ￿ ￿ ￿rst-order-stochastic
dominates the distribution of ￿2, given ￿; i.e. x ￿ x and x + ￿ ￿ x + ￿: Neglecting the other
incentive-compatibility constraints, it is then immediate that, to limit the rent of the high type, it
is optimal for the seller to set U(￿) = 0 and to make the following downward adjacent incentive-
compatibility constraints binding
U2 (￿;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿;￿m) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿;￿m) (16)
U2 (￿;￿m) ￿ U2 (￿;￿l) ￿ ￿￿q2 (￿;￿l)
Note that, what determines the expected surplus of the high type are not the values of the con-
tinuation payo⁄s U2 (￿;￿) per se, but the "speed" at which the continuation payo⁄s for the low
type changes with the shock ￿. Now suppose that, when searching for the optimal mechanism, the
only relevant constraints are the participation constraint for the low type at t = 1; U(￿) ￿ 0, the
incentive-compatibility constraints (16) for the low type at t = 2 and the incentive-compatibility
constraint (14) for the high type at t = 1 (any individually-rational and incentive-compatible mech-
anism must satisfy these constraints, but alone they do not necessarily guarantee that the buyer
￿nds it optimal to participate and truthfully reveal his information in both periods). We then have
9the following result.
Lemma 2 Assume
￿￿ ￿ minf￿￿;￿￿g, ￿ x ￿ x and ￿ x + ￿ ￿ x + ￿: (17)







E￿1 f￿1q1(￿) ￿ C(q1(￿1)) + ￿E￿ [(￿1 + ￿)q2(￿1;￿) ￿ C(q2(￿1;￿)) j ￿1] ￿ U(￿1)g
subject to U (￿) ￿ 0; (15) and (16)





q1(￿) = maxfqFB(￿) ￿ ￿
1￿￿￿￿;0g;



























The result in Lemma (2) is quite intriguing, for it suggests that, contrary to what indicated in
the literature, distortions in the contract for the low type need not decrease over time. But when
does the solution to the relaxed program actually coincide with the optimal mechanism, i.e. with
the solution to the following unrelaxed program?
P :
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
max
￿
E￿1 f￿1q1(￿) ￿ C(q1(￿1)) + ￿E￿ [(￿1 + ￿)q2(￿1;￿) ￿ C(q2(￿1;￿)) j ￿1] ￿ U(￿1)g
subject to
U(￿1) = ~ U(￿1) 8￿1 (IC)
U (￿1) ￿ 0 8￿1 (IR-1)
U2 (￿1;￿) ￿ 0 8(￿1;￿) (IR-2)
The answer is in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume Condition (17) holds. The solution to the relaxed program Pr coincides
with the solution to the unrelaxed program P if and only if the quantities q2(￿;￿) in Lemma (2) are
nondecreasing in ￿: When this is the case, the optimal mechanism has the following properties:
1. There are no distortions in the contract for the high type;
102. All quantities in the contract for the low type are downward distorted;
3. Distortions in period two are (weakly) higher than those in period one;
4. Distortions need not be monotonic in the magnitude of the shock ￿: In particular, distortions
can be higher after a favorable than an unfavorable shock to the buyer￿ s type.
It is useful to contrast the result in the previous proposition to the one in Battaglini (2005) for
the case ￿t 2 f￿ ￿;￿g for all t:
Proposition 2 (Battaglini) Assume ￿t 2 f￿ ￿;￿g for all t. The optimal contract has the following
properties.
(a) Generalized No Distortion at the Top: As soon as the buyer experiences a positive shock
which raises his valuation to ￿ ￿; he receives ￿rst-best quantities thereafter.
(b) Vanishing Distortion at the Bottom: Distortions for the low type decrease over time and
vanish in the long-run.
Battaglini￿ s model is nested in this example by letting ￿￿ = ￿￿ = ￿￿ and then letting ￿ x =
0 = 1￿￿￿x: The comparison between Propositions (1) and (2) uncovers interesting properties of
optimal long-term contracts. A form of Generalized No Distortion at the Top seems robust: as soon
as the buyer￿ s valuation reaches the maximal possible value for period t; then the seller provides
￿rst-best output to the buyer thereafter. On the contrary, the Vanish Distortion at the Bottom does
not appear robust; it is sensitive to the assumption that high types cannot experience shocks that
further increase their valuations and likewise that low types cannot experience shocks that further
reduce their valuations. Such a property thus holds when the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov-1
process with a binary state space, but need not extend to more general Markov processes, as I further
discuss in the next section.4 Together these results o⁄er an important message: What determines
the dynamics of distortions is the familiar trade-o⁄between e¢ ciency and rent-extraction, evaluated
from period one￿ s perspective; not the fact that the agent￿ s current type is just a noisy predictor
of the agent￿ s future types, as suggested in the literature. Actually, this can be seen directly
from Battaglini￿ s model by considering the following transition probabilities: Pr(￿ ￿j￿ ￿) = 1 and
Pr(￿ ￿j￿) = ￿ 2 (0;:5): The distortions in the contract for the low type are then constant over time,
despite the absence of perfect correlation. This result can also be seen from Proposition (1) by
letting ￿￿ = ￿￿ = ￿￿. In this case, stochastic dominance simply requires that ￿ x + ￿ ￿ > x: The
4The results that distortions need not decrease over time and need not be monotonic in the shocks extend to
environments in which shocks are "small" as compared to the initial type ￿1, i.e. to settings in which condition (17)
is violated.
Also note that, while in this paper I am assuming the seller can perfectly commit to her mechanism, the afore-
mentioned results extend to settings in which the seller can o⁄er long-term contracts but cannot commit not to
renegotiate. Both results are available upon request.
11solution to the optimal mechanism then coincides with the one in Lemma (2) substituting ￿￿ and
￿￿ with ￿￿: There are no distortions in the contract for the high type, whereas the quantities in
the contract for the low type are given by
q1(￿) = maxfqFB





























The special case in which ￿t 2 f￿ ￿;￿g for all t is then nested with ￿ x = 0 = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x. In this case
there is no distortion for q2(￿;￿h); whereas the quantity the seller supplies in period two to a low











When ￿ = 1; i.e. when the valuation of the high type is constant over time, q2(￿;￿m) = q1(￿),
irrespective of ￿; i.e. irrespective of the level of correlation between the buyer￿ s valuations in the
two periods.
Another case of special interest is when the buyer￿ s types are correlated over time, but the shocks
to the buyer￿ s valuations are independent of ￿; i.e. when ￿ x = x and ￿ ￿ = ￿: As one can immediately
see from Lemma (2), in this case distortions in the contract for the low type are constant over time
and do not depend on the shocks￿distributions, i.e. on ￿ and x. As I show in the next section, this
property holds more generally whenever there is enough overlap in the support of the distribution
of the agent￿ s type over time￿ a property that is always satis￿ed with a continuum of types.
4 Independent shocks
From now on, consider the case in which ￿t is independent of both ￿1 and ￿s, for any s 6= t: A
special case of interest (for many applications) is the case in which the buyer￿ s valuation evolves
in continuous time following a Brownian motion (possibly with drift), but in which trade occurs
in discrete time. This case is nested in the model considered in this section. More generally, as I
show in Section 5, all continuous Markov processes can be reconducted to the class considered in
this section by appropriately specifying the distributions of the shocks and the vt functions.
In what follows, I ￿rst consider the case where both ￿1 and ￿t are drawn from a continuous
distribution, and then turn back to the case of ￿nitely-many types at the end of the section.
124.1 Continuum of types
Suppose that ￿1 is drawn from an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function F with
log-concave density f strictly positive over ￿1 ￿ [￿;￿ ￿]: Next, assume that, for any t ￿ 2;
￿t = vt(￿1;￿t)
with ￿t drawn from an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function Gt with support
￿t ￿ [￿
t;￿ ￿t]. While for convenience I am restricting attention to environments with a compact
state space, the results extend to environments in which the supports of F and Gt coincide with
the entire real line as it is the case with Normally distributed shocks.
The functions vt are assumed to be strictly increasing and twice continuously di⁄erentiable in
each argument. A special case of interest is that of a (possibly non-stationary) AR(1) process:







aj￿2 + ￿ ￿ ￿ + at￿t￿1 + ￿t
with aj 2 R+ for all j ￿ 2: The case of independent types is then nested as aj = 0; for all j; while
the random-walk case is nested as aj = 1.
To illustrate the logic behind the characterization results, assume for a moment that T = 2 (to
save on notation, I then suppress the subscripts for v and ￿): The strategy I follow to characterize
the optimal mechanism is the same as in the previous section. First, I identify some necessary
conditions for incentive-compatibility; next, I maximize the seller￿ s expected revenue subject to
these conditions. Finally, I identify properties of the stochastic process that guarantee that these
conditions are also su¢ cient.
First, consider incentive-compatibility at t = 2. As it is standard, incentive compatibility
requires that, for any ￿1 2 ￿1 and any ￿ 2 ￿;





q2(￿1;~ ￿)d~ ￿; (20)
with q2(￿1;￿) nondecreasing in ￿. Using the envelope theorem, we then have that incentive com-
patibility at t = 1 requires that, for any ￿1 2 ￿1;












13Abstracting from the monotonicity conditions, we then have that the seller￿ s relaxed problem can
be stated as follows.
Pr :
8
> > > > > > <









[v(￿1;￿)q2(￿1;￿) ￿ C(q2(￿1;￿))]dG(￿) ￿ U(￿1)gdF(￿)
s.t. (20), (21), U(￿) ￿ 0 and U2(￿1;￿) ￿ 0 8(￿1;￿)























It is then immediate that the solution to the program Pr is independent of the participation and















Turning to the general case in which T ￿ 2 we can then rede￿ne Pr to denote the relaxed program
in which the seller maximizes her period-1 expected payo⁄ subject to the sole constraints that
U(￿) = 0 and

























for any ￿1 2 ￿1; where dW2 ￿ dG2(￿2) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ dGT(￿T): We then have the following result.
















; t ￿ 2:
I will come back in a moment to the conditions that guarantee that the solution to the relaxed
14program coincides with the optimal mechanism. For the moment, suppose this is the case. The
optimal mechanism then has the following properties.
Corollary 1 Assume the optimal mechanism coincides with the solution to the relaxed program.
Then,
(i) the quantity schedules (as well as the players￿payo⁄s) coincide with the ones the seller would
o⁄er if the shocks were jointly observed instead of being the buyer￿ s private information;
(ii) distortions may either increase or decrease over time, depending on the dynamics of the
sensitivity of the buyer￿ s future valuations to his initial type;
(iii) distortions are independent of the shocks￿distributions;
(iv) the seller may ￿nd it optimal to exclude a buyer for a few periods and then serve him again
once his valuation has su¢ ciently improved;
(v) starting from t = 2; a high-valuation buyer may receive a smaller quantity than a low-
valuation buyer;
(vi) unless vs(￿1;￿s) is independent of ￿1 for all s ￿ t; or ￿1 = ￿ ￿, it is never optimal for the
seller to transfer the ownership of the production technology to the buyer.
Provided the optimal mechanism coincides with the solution to the relaxed program, then
whether the agent possesses private information about the shocks or not is irrelevant for the dy-
namics of the optimal quantities as well as for expected payo⁄s. The only possible e⁄ect of the
buyer￿ s private information about the shocks is on the dynamics of prices. In fact, as standard
with quasi-linear payo⁄s, while the expected transfers are uniquely determined, their dynamics are
not. In particular, while with public shocks the seller can always ask the buyer to pay everything
up-front in period one, when the shocks are the buyer￿ s private information, it is key for truthful
information revelation to have the buyer pay also in subsequent periods.5
Next, consider parts (ii)-(iii). To better appreciate these parts, consider the case in which ￿t











Whether distortions decrease or increase over time then depends on how the buyer￿ s initial type ￿1
impacts his future valuations. If as < 1 for all s; then distortions decrease over time. If however,
as = 1 for all s; as in the random walk case, or when ￿t follows a Brownian motion (possibly with
drift), then distortions remain constant over time. In this case the optimal mechanism is very
5One may think that the result in part (i) is a direct implication of the fact that the shocks are independent of
the buyer￿ s initial type. As shown below, this is not correct. Also note that the result relies on the fact that the
supports of the buyer￿ s valuations over any two adjacent periods exhibit enough overlapping (in a sense that will be
made clear below). This is always the case with the continuum, but not necessarily with ￿nitely-many types.
15simple. It￿ s a menu of long-term contracts according to which in each period the seller provides
the buyer a quantity equal to the ￿rst-best, net of a distortion that depends only on the buyer￿ s
￿rst-period type. More generally, distortions may also be a⁄ected by the shocks that the buyer
experiences over time, but are independent of the shocks￿distributions.
Finally, consider parts (iv)-(vi). That the seller may ￿nd it optimal to exclude the buyer for






can become negative for a few periods and then turn positive again after a sequence of favorable
shocks. Similarly, that a high-valuation buyer may receive a lower quantity than a low-valuation
buyer is a direct consequence of the fact that the optimal mechanism exhibits memory: the quantity
that the buyer receives at any point in time is a function not only of the buyer￿ s current valuation
but also of how his valuation evolved over time.6 Finally, that it is essentially never optimal to
transfer the ownership of the production technology to the buyer is a consequence of the fact that
distortions do not disappear over time. Unless the buyer￿ s type in period one is the highest, or
unless after a certain point in time valuations become independent of the buyer￿ s initial type,
then it is optimal for the seller to maintain distortions throughout the entire relationship. This
immediately precludes the possibility of transferring ownership of the production technology to the
buyer, for in that case the buyer implements the ￿rst best thereafter.
I now turn to the conditions that guarantee that the optimal schedules coincide with those that
solve the relaxed program. First consider the following enlargement of the message space. For any
t ￿ 2; let ￿
t
and ￿t be recursively de￿ned by
vt(￿ ￿1;￿2;:::;￿t￿1;￿
t






~ ￿t = [￿
t
;￿t]
This enlargement of the message space is redundant when Supp[Gt] is unbounded; when instead
it is bounded, it is a simple trick that permits us to describe in a convenient way the buyer￿ s
behavior o⁄ equilibrium. In fact, note that ~ ￿t is constructed so that the buyer can reveal his true
valuation in period t, for any possible history of past reports (i.e. even after misreporting the shocks
experienced in the past). Clearly in equilibrium, the only messages that the buyer will send are
6That the optimal contract exhibits memory is a property that holds true also in models with a binary type space.
However,in those models high-valuation buyers always receive at least as much quantity as low valuation ones.
16those that belong to the intervals ￿t ￿ Supp[Gt]:
Now suppose the following condition holds (all subsequent conditions are meant to hold over
the extended state space ￿ ￿ ~ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿T:)





vs(￿1;￿t;￿t+1;:::;￿s) = vs(~ ￿1;~ ￿
t
;￿t+1;:::;￿s)
for any pair of histories
￿
￿1;￿t￿
and (~ ￿1;~ ￿
t
) such that vt(￿1;￿t) = vt(~ ￿1;~ ￿
t
):
Together with the assumption of independent shocks, this condition implies that the buyer￿ s
valuation follows a Markov process: for any t and any history of valuations ht ￿ (￿1;:::;￿t); the
distribution of (￿t+1;￿t+2;:::;￿T) given ht depends only on ￿t.
Next, consider the following property.
Condition 2 (Strong monotonicity) The quantity schedules qt(￿) are nondecreasing in each ar-
gument and satisfy the property that, for any t ￿ 2; any s ￿ t + 1, any (￿t+2;:::;￿s); and any pair
(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1) and (￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿t;~ ￿t+1) such that vt+1(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1) = vt+1(￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿t;~ ￿t+1),7
qs(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1;￿t+2;:::;￿s) ￿ (resp. ￿) qs(￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿t;~ ￿t+1;￿t+2;:::;￿s)
if and only if ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t (resp. ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t); similarly, for any (￿1;￿2) and (~ ￿1;~ ￿2) such that v2(￿1;￿2) =
v2(~ ￿1;~ ￿2) and for any (￿3;:::;￿s), qs(￿1;￿2;:::;￿s) ￿ (resp. ￿) qs(~ ￿1;~ ￿2;￿3;:::;￿s) if and only if
￿1 ￿ ~ ￿1 (resp. ￿1 ￿ ~ ￿1).
Together with the Markov property, this condition guarantees that, holding constant the buyer￿ s
valuation from period one to period t￿1 and from period t+1 to period s, the quantity the seller
provides in period s is higher the higher the shock (and hence the buyer￿ s valuation) in period t:
In other words, an unfavorable shock in period t followed by a favorable one in period t + 1 leads
to smaller future quantities than a favorable shock in period t followed by an unfavorable one in
period t + 1 that result in the same period t + 1 valuation.
Note that the schedules that solve the relaxed program always satisfy the monotonicity prop-
erties of Condition (2) when the agent￿ s valuation follows an AR(1) process￿ as de￿ned in (19).
By implication, these conditions are also satis￿ed when the agent￿ s valuation evolves in continuous
time following a Brownian motion. Furthermore, these conditions are also satis￿ed for example in
7If t = 2; drop ￿
t￿1 from all expressions. Similarly, if s = t + 1; then drop (￿t+2;:::;￿s):
17the case of multiplicative shocks,8 i.e. when
vt(￿1;￿t) = ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t (24)
with Supp[Gs] ￿ R+, for any s: In this case, the schedules that solve the relaxed program are
qt(￿1;￿t) = max
n









We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov process and that the schedules of
Proposition 3 satisfy the strong monotonicity properties of Condition (2). Then in any optimal
mechanism the quantity schedules coincide with those in Proposition 3.
The proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix is in two steps. First, I show how starting from
t = T and proceeding backward one can construct recursively a pro￿le of transfers that have the
following property: if the buyer reported truthfully up to period t￿1 he prefers reporting truthfully
from period t onward rather than lying in period t and then reporting truthfully thereafter. In each
period, these transfers are uniquely determined by the quantity schedules up to a scalar that can be
set optimally to guarantee participation. The second step then shows how incentive compatibility
can be established recursively, again starting from t = T: Using the trick of the enlarged message
space, the best the buyer can do after lying in period t by reporting a shock ^ ￿t 6= ￿t is to lie again
in period t + 1 by reporting a shock ^ ￿
￿
t+1 = ^ ￿
￿
t+1(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;^ ￿t;￿t+1) implicitly de￿ned by
vt+1(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t;￿￿
t+1) = vt+1(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1)
and then reporting truthfully from period t+2 onward. This property is an immediate consequence
of the fact that the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov process and of the fact that (by recursive
construction) the mechanism is incentive compatible (on the equilibrium path) from period t + 1
onward. Because the buyer￿ s (equilibrium) continuation payo⁄s are increasing in the present and
future level of trade, we then have that, when the quantity schedules satisfy the monotonicity
properties of Condition (2), the surplus the seller leaves to the buyer when the latter can lie
only once is large enough to discourage him from lying also when he can misrepresent his private
information multiple times.
The next proposition (which is technical and with little economics) identi￿es properties of the
8The case of multiplicative shocks seems particularly appropriate in the contest of borrower-lender relationships,
in which case the shocks represent variations in the return to invested capital.
18stochastic process that guarantee that indeed the schedules of Proposition 3 satisfy the monotonicity
properties of Condition (2).
Proposition 5 Suppose that, in addition to the Markov property, the buyer￿ s valuations satisfy the
following conditions.
(i) vt(￿1;￿t) are concave in ￿1 and
@2vt(￿1;￿t)
@￿1@￿s ￿ 0 for any (￿1;￿t); s ￿ t.























Then the quantity schedules of Proposition 3 satisfy the monotonicity properties of Condition
(2).
Transitory shocks. I now turn to the case in which the shocks ￿t have no persistent e⁄ect
on the buyer￿ s valuation. In this case, Condition (1) is violated￿ these processes are clearly not
Markov. Nevertheless, essentially the same conditions that guarantee that the optimal mechanism
coincides with the solution to the relaxed program in the case of a Markov process guarantee that
the same holds true in the case of a stochastic process with transitory shocks.
Proposition 6 Suppose there exist functions zt : R2 ￿! R such that vt(￿1;￿t) = zt(￿1;￿t), for any
(￿1;￿t) and any t:






) such that vt(￿1;￿t) = vt(~ ￿1;~ ￿
t
),
qt(￿1;￿t) ￿ (resp. ￿) qt(~ ￿1;~ ￿
t
) if and only if ￿1 ￿ ~ ￿1 (resp. ￿1 ￿ ~ ￿1):
Then in any optimal mechanism the quantity schedules coincide with those in Proposition 3.












Then the quantity schedules of Proposition 3 satisfy the monotonicity properties of part (i) of
this proposition.
19An example of a stochastic process with transitory shocks that satis￿es the conditions in the




= ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t
with ￿ 2 (0;1) and Supp[Gt] = Supp[F] for all t: This is a stochastic process in which the set of
possible types is stationary over time, i.e. ￿t = ￿1 for all t but which violates the Markov property.
The dynamics of distortions is then extremely simple and given by
d1(￿1) ￿ qFB
1 (￿1) ￿ q1(￿1) =
1￿F(￿1)
f(￿1)
while for any t ￿ 2
dt(￿1;￿2;:::;￿t) ￿ qFB
t (￿1;￿2;:::;￿t) ￿ qt(￿1;￿2;:::;￿t) = ￿
1￿F(￿1)
f(￿1)
Holding constant the buyer￿ s valuation, distortions thus exhibit a downward discontinuity from
period one to period two and are constant thereafter.
This example together with the random walk version of (19) thus suggests a possible explana-
tion of what drives the results in Battaglini￿ s two-type model. The property that distortions in the
optimal contract vanish over time appears to be a consequence of the combination of two assump-
tions: that the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov process and that the set of possible valuations is
bounded and stationary over time. If the buyer￿ s valuations follow a Markov process but the set of
possible valuations is either unbounded or it changes over time, as in the random walk case, then
distortions need not vanish. Likewise, if the set of possible valuations is bounded and stationary
over time, but valuations do not follow a Markov process, as in the last example, then again there
is no reason to expect distortions to disappear in the long-run.
The following observation is then an immediate implication of the preceding results.
Corollary 2 Consider the following two processes:













+: The dynamics of distortions in any optimal mechanism are the same for
(a) and (b).
20What di⁄erentiates the two processes in Corollary 2 is only the persistence of the shocks. Such
a distinction, however, need not be relevant for the dynamics of distortions. The result holds more
generally for any pair of processes for which the optimal mechanism coincides with the solution
to the relaxed program and for which the dynamics of the sensitivity @vt(￿1;￿t)=@￿1 of future
valuations to the buyer￿ s initial type is the same.
4.2 Finitely-many types
Consider now the same model with independent shocks examined above, but assume that in each
period there are ￿nitely many types. Continue to denote by F(￿1) the c.d.f. of the buyer￿ s ￿rst
period type but now let f(￿1) denote the corresponding probability distribution function instead
of the density. Without loss, then order the buyer￿ s ￿rst-period types so that ￿1
1 < ￿2
1 < ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿N
1
and, for any n; let ￿￿n ￿ ￿n+1
1 ￿ ￿n
1 with ￿￿N ￿ 0: Then for any t ￿ 2 let
￿￿nvt(￿n
1;￿t) ￿ vt(￿n+1




The support of the shocks￿distributions Gt is now a ￿nite set ￿t: As in the previous section,
let ~ ￿t denote the extended message space de￿ned recursively by
~ ￿t = f~ ￿t 2 R s.t. vt(￿1;~ ￿
t￿1
;~ ￿t) = ￿t for some ￿t 2 ￿t and (￿1;~ ￿
t￿1
) 2 ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t￿1
t g:
As in the previous section, these extended message spaces simply permit the buyer to reveal his
type in period t after having lied in the past:
Now suppose the seller can observe the shocks (but not the buyer￿ s initial type ￿1). Then
consider the relaxed program in which the seller maximizes her expected payo⁄ subject to the sole
constraints that each type ￿1 must ￿nd it optimal to participate in the seller￿ s mechanism in period
one (but not necessarily thereafter) and truthfully reveal his type. Call this relaxed program Pr:
We then have the following result.




























; t ￿ 2
are increasing in each argument. Then they solve the relaxed program Pr.
Now suppose the supports of the buyer￿ s valuations overlap enough in the sense de￿ned by the
21following condition.
Condition 3 (Overlapping supports) Let ￿t and ￿0
t be any two adjacent shocks for period t ￿ 2;
with ￿t < ￿0
t. Then for any pair of adjacent shocks ￿t+1 and ￿0
t+1 with ￿t+1 > ￿0




Similarly, for any pair of adjacent period-1 types ￿1 and ￿0
1, with ￿1 < ￿0
1, and any pair of adjacent
shocks ￿2 and ￿0
2 with ￿2 > ￿0
2; vs(￿1;￿2;￿3:::;￿s) = v2(￿0
1;￿0
2;￿3;:::;￿s) for any s ￿ 2 and any
(￿3;:::;￿s):
When the overlapping condition holds, the result in Proposition 4 that the optimal schedules
coincide with those that the seller would o⁄er when the shocks are jointly observed continues to
hold.
Proposition 7 Suppose the buyer￿ s valuation follows a ￿nite Markov process with independent
shocks and that the overlapping support condition holds. Assume the schedules in Lemma 3, ex-
tended over the enlarged state space ￿ ￿ ~ ￿T, satisfy the strong monotonicity properties of Condi-
tion 2. Then in any optimal mechanism the quantity schedules coincide with those in Lemma 3
and each player obtains the same expected payo⁄ as when the shocks to the buyer￿ s valuation are
jointly observed.
An example of a stochastic process that satis￿es the conditions in Proposition 7 is the process
considered in Section 3: vt(￿1;￿t) = ￿1 +
Pt
s=2 ￿s, with ￿1 = f￿;￿ ￿g, ￿t = f￿h;￿m;￿lg, ￿h = +￿￿;
￿m = 0; ￿l = ￿￿￿; Pr(￿1 = ￿ ￿) = v, Pr(￿t = ￿h) = x and Pr(￿t = ￿m) = ￿, for all t: In this case,











if ￿1 = ￿
In this example distortions in the contract for the low type are constant over time and have the
familiar structure dt(￿;￿t) = v￿￿=(1 ￿ v) for all t:
This example also illustrates the role of the overlapping condition. For simplicity, assume T = 2.
To induce the buyer to reveal truthfully the shock ￿2, the seller can make all downward adjacent
incentive-compatibility constraints for period two binding. This accounts to choosing prices p2(￿1;￿)
such that
U2 (￿1;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿m) = ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿m) (25)
U2 (￿1;￿m) ￿ U2 (￿1;￿l) = ￿￿q2 (￿1;￿l) (26)
22for both ￿1 = ￿ and ￿1 = ￿ ￿. Lemma 1, then implies that a high type who mimics the low type in
period one and then experiences a shock ￿h strictly prefers to report the shock truthfully in period
two than lying, whereas he is indi⁄erent between reporting the true shock or one just below it when
the shock he experiences is either ￿m or ￿l: This in turn implies that, when the transfers for period
two satisfy (25) and (26), the expected surplus the seller must leave to the high type in period one
is
U(￿ ￿) = U(￿) + ￿￿q1(￿) + ￿￿E￿ [q2(￿;￿)]
This is exactly the same surplus the seller would give to the high type when shocks are jointly
observed.
Now suppose instead that the shocks ￿h; ￿m and ￿l are such that ￿￿ ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿m < ￿￿ and
￿￿ ￿ ￿m ￿ ￿l < ￿￿ (with ￿￿ = ￿￿ + ￿￿): From Lemma 1, we have that, when the high type lies
in period one, then in period two, irrespective of the true shock ￿; he strictly prefers to report ￿h
than either ￿m or ￿l. By implication, the expected surplus the seller must leave to the high type in
period one must be at least
U(￿) + ￿￿q1(￿) + E￿ [U2 (￿;￿h) ￿ U2 (￿;￿) + (￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿h)q2(￿;￿h)]
which is strictly higher than the surplus U(￿)+￿￿q1(￿)+￿￿E￿ [q2(￿;￿)] that the seller must leave
to the high type when shocks are jointly observed. There is then no reason to expect the schedules
of Lemma 3 to be optimal any more. In fact, one can show that the best the seller can do in this
example is to o⁄er the following quantities to the low type9 (assuming q2(￿;￿) are monotonic in ￿
which is always the case for v low enough)
q1(￿) = maxfqFB(￿) ￿ ￿
1￿￿￿￿;0g (27)























In contrast to the case of overlapping types, the distortions in the contract for the low-type now
depend on the details of the shock distribution (i.e. on the probabilities x and ￿): However, as in
the case of large shocks, it remains true that distortions need not vanish over time and need not
be monotonic in the size of the shock to the buyer￿ s valuation.
9The proof is available upon request.
235 Foundations for independent shocks
The results in the previous section have been established assuming the shocks to the buyer￿ s valu-
ation are independent. I now show that this assumption is actually less restrictive than it appears.
The results in this section follow from arguments similar to those used to establish Lemmas 1 and 2
in Eso and Szentes (2007): the subsequent propositions extend their results to an arbitrary number
of periods and an arbitrary number of decisions.
Proposition 8 Suppose for any t and any (￿1;:::;￿t￿1); the distribution of ￿t given (￿1;:::;￿t￿1)
is continuous and strictly increasing in ￿t: Then there exist a collection of real-valued functions
vt : Rt ￿! R and a collection of random variables ￿t such that, for any t ￿ 2; the process can be
described by
￿t = vt(￿1;￿t)
with (￿1;￿T) jointly independent.
Assuming independent shocks is thus truly without loss of generality in the case of a continuous
process. The approach indicated in the previous section to represent the necessary conditions for
incentive-compatibility (and the corresponding solution to the relaxed program) are thus quite
general. On the other hand, the su¢ cient conditions of Proposition 4 require that, in the case of a
Markov process, the functions vt be increasing in each argument. The next proposition shows that
this is equivalent to assuming ￿rst-order-stochastic-dominance.
Proposition 9 (i) Assume the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov process and that the conditional
distribution function of ￿t given ￿t￿1 is continuous, strictly increasing in ￿t and strictly decreasing
in ￿t￿1: Then the corresponding functions vt are strictly increasing in each argument.
(ii) Assume the process for ￿t satis￿es the conditions in part (i) in this proposition. Then any
pair of collections (vt;￿t)T
t=2 and (~ vt;~ ￿t)T








for any (￿1;￿t) and (￿1;~ ￿
t
) for which vs(￿1;￿s) = ~ vs(￿1;~ ￿
s
) for any s ￿ t.
Part (i) is self-explanatory. Part (ii) establishes that, although the representation of a stochastic
process by means of a collection of independent innovations is not unique, any representation of the
same Markov process leads to the same solution to the relaxed program. Using the aforementioned
results, the su¢ cient conditions of Proposition 5￿ which guarantee that the solution to the relaxed
program coincides with the optimal mechanism￿ can then be translated in terms of conditional
distributions.
24Proposition 10 Assume the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov process and, for any t ￿ 2; let
Ft(￿t;￿t￿1) denote the conditional distribution of ￿t given ￿t￿1 with ft(￿t;￿t￿1) denoting the corre-
sponding density. Suppose the functions Ft satisfy the properties of part (i) in Proposition 9 and
that, in addition,
[@Ft(￿t;￿t￿1)=@￿t￿1]=[ft(￿t;￿t￿1)]
are well-de￿ned, and increasing in both ￿t and ￿t￿1. Then the corresponding functions vt satisfy
the conditions of Proposition 5.
Similarly, one can show that the results in Proposition 6 for the case of transitory shocks
extend more generally to any stochastic process that satis￿es the property that the conditional
distribution of ￿t given (￿1;:::;￿t￿1) is strictly increasing in ￿t, decreasing in ￿1, and is independent
of (￿2;:::;￿t￿1):
The results in the previous section for the case of independent shocks thus apply to a quite rich
class of continuous stochastic processes.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Because ￿2(￿1;￿00) and ￿2(￿1;￿0) are incentive-compatible, there exists a
tari⁄ T2 : R+ ! R such that T2(q2(￿1;￿00)) = p2(￿1;￿00); T2(q2(￿1;￿0)) = p2(￿1;￿0) and T2(q2) = +1
for any q2 6= q2(￿1;￿0);q2(￿1;￿00): Furthermore, necessarily q2(￿1;￿0) < q2(￿1;￿00): The result then
follows directly from Topkis￿Monotonicity Theorem using the fact that the function g(￿2;q2) ￿ ￿2q2
satis￿es the increasing di⁄erence property.
Proof of Proposition 1. I prove the result by showing that, whenever the quantities q2(￿;￿)
characterized in Lemma 2 are nondecreasing in ￿; there exists a pro￿le of transfers that along with
the quantities of Lemma 2 satis￿es all the constraints in P:
















The constraints (IR-2) are then trivially satis￿ed. The monotonicity of q2(￿;￿) in ￿ along with
Lemma 1 then guarantee that the mechanism is incentive-compatible at t = 2 i.e. that U2 (￿;￿) =
~ U2 (￿;￿;￿) for any (￿;￿):
Next, consider the agent￿ s incentives at t = 1: First consider a type ￿ ￿ who reports ￿ at t = 1:
The fact that the constraints (16) bind together with Condition (17) and Lemma 1 implies that
the best ￿ ￿ can do at t = 2 after lying at t = 1 is to report the shock ￿ truthfully. Constraint (15)
then guarantees that ￿ ￿ obtains his maximal intertemporal payo⁄ by reporting truthfully in both
periods, i.e. that (IC) is satis￿ed for ￿ ￿.
Now consider the incentives of a low type. The fact that constraints (28) bind together with
Condition (17) and Lemma 1 imply that the best ￿ can do at t = 2 after lying at t = 1 is to report
the shock ￿ truthfully. The following is then a su¢ cient condition for (IC) to be satis￿ed for ￿:
U(￿) ￿ U(￿) ￿ ￿￿q1(￿) ￿ ￿fxU2(￿;￿h) + ￿U2(￿;￿m) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x)U2(￿;￿l)g
+ ￿fx[U2(￿;￿h) ￿ ￿￿q2(￿;￿h)] + ￿[U2(￿;￿m) ￿ ￿￿q2(￿;￿m)]
+ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x)[U2(￿;￿l) ￿ ￿￿q2(￿;￿l)]g
(29)
The right hand side in (29) is the payo⁄ that ￿ obtains by reporting ￿ ￿ at t = 1 and then truthfully
announcing the shock ￿ at t = 2. Condition (29) can be conveniently rewritten as
U(￿) ￿ U(￿) + ￿￿q1(￿) + ￿f(x ￿ x)[U2(￿;￿h) ￿ U2(￿;￿m)]
+ (￿ x + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ x)[U2(￿;￿m) ￿ U2(￿;￿l)] + x￿￿q2(￿;￿h)
+ ￿￿￿q2(￿;￿m) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ x)￿￿q2(￿;￿l)g
(30)
The fact that (15), (16) and (28) are saturated together with Condition (17) and the fact that
q2(￿;￿) ￿ q2(￿ ￿;￿) for all ￿ then implies that (30) is satis￿ed. I conclude that (IC) is also satis￿ed
for ￿: Finally, that (IR-1) is satis￿ed for ￿ ￿ follows immediately from (15) and the fact that U(￿) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 4. I want to show that there exists a mechanism that implements the
allocations of Proposition 3 and gives each player the same expected payo⁄ as the solution to the
relaxed program. I prove the result in two steps. Step 1 constructs the mechanism. Step 2 then
proves that, when the quantity schedules satisfy the strong monotonicity properties of Condition
26(2), a buyer who reported truthfully up to period t ￿ 1; (weakly) prefers to report truthfully from
period t onward rather than lying in period t and then choosing optimally what to report in any
subsequent period.
Step 1. Consider the following mechanism. For each t, the quantity schedules qt(￿1;￿t) are
as in Proposition 3, de￿ned over the enlarged state space ￿1 ￿ ~ ￿T. The transfer schedules are
constructed as follows. Start from t = T. Given the schedules qT(￿), take any pro￿le of transfers
pT(￿) such that, for any (￿1;￿T￿1;￿T);










qT(￿1;￿T￿1;~ ￿T)d~ ￿T (31)
for an arbitrary scalar UT(￿1;￿T￿1;￿
T
) ￿ 0: Proceeding backward, starting from T￿1, then consider
an arbitrary t < T. Holding constant the transfers constructed for periods t + 1 onward, take any
pro￿le of transfers pt(￿) such that
pt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t) = vt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t)qt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t) ￿ Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t)
where Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿
t































where dWt ￿ dGt+1(￿+1) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ dGT(￿T):
Step 2. I now want to show that the mechanism constructed in Step 1 guarantees that, a buyer
who reported truthfully up to period t ￿ 1; (weakly) prefers to report truthfully from period t
onwards rather than lying in period t and then choosing optimally what to report at any subsequent
date. I establish the result by backward induction.
Start from t = T: Because the schedules qT(￿) are nondecreasing in ~ ￿T; standard results in static
mechanism design￿ e.g. Myerson (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)￿ imply that, a buyer
27who reported (￿1;￿T￿1) in the past and whose period-T valuation is vT(￿1;￿T￿1;￿T) prefers to
report ￿T than reporting any other ￿0
T; for any ￿T;￿0
T 2 ~ ￿T: The fact that the buyer￿ s valuation
follows a Markov process then also implies, a buyer who reported (￿1;￿T￿1) in the past and who
experiences a shock ￿T in period T ￿nds it optimal to report the shock ￿T truthfully when the
true shocks he experienced in the past are (~ ￿1;~ ￿
T￿1
); for any (~ ￿1;~ ￿
T￿1
) such that vT￿1(~ ￿1;~ ￿
T￿1
) =
vT￿1(￿1;￿T￿1): That a buyer who reported
￿
￿1;￿T￿1￿
in the past and whose period-T valuation is




Now take any t < T and suppose the result established for period T holds more generally for
any s > t. If the buyer reported truthfully in the past and reports truthfully in period t, then he
best he can do is to report truthfully also at any subsequent period, in which case his expected
payo⁄ is Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t): If instead he reports ^ ￿t 6= ￿t in period t; he obtains
vt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t)qt(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t) ￿ pt(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t)










and any ^ ￿t 6= ￿t;
Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t) ￿ ^ Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t) (33)
where



































; the constraint (33) can be
28rewritten as

















































































t+1 = ^ ￿
￿
t+1(￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿t;^ ￿t;￿t+1) is the buyer￿ s optimal report for period t + 1: The fact that
the buyer￿ s valuation follows a Markov process along with the fact that the mechanism is incentive-
compatible (on the equilibrium path) from period t+1 onward, implies that the best the buyer can







































Combining (35) with (36), it is then immediate to see that the inequality in (34) holds whenever
the quantity schedules satisfy the strong monotonicity properties of Condition (2). Finally, that
a buyer who reported
￿
￿1;￿T￿1￿
in the past and whose period-t valuation is vt(￿1;￿T￿1;￿t) ￿nds it
optimal to participate in period t follows from (32) together with the fact that Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿
t
) ￿ 0:
Iterating up to t = 1; then proves that the mechanism constructed in step 1 is indeed incentive
compatible and it induces the buyer to participate in each period.
Proof of Proposition 5. Condition (i) in the proposition, together with the monotone hazard
rate assumption, guarantees that the quantity schedules in (22) are non-decreasing. Now take any


























qs(￿1;￿t￿2;~ ￿t￿1;~ ￿t;￿t+1;:::;￿s) ￿ qs(￿1;￿t￿2;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1;:::;￿s) (38)
10If t = 3; then drop ￿
t￿2 from all expressions.













Now, using the Implicit Function theorem applied to (37), there exists a function ￿￿
t : ￿t￿1 ￿! ~ ￿t














































Substituting (40) into (41), we then have that (39) is satis￿ed if condition (ii) in the proposition
holds. Similar arguments establish the result for t = 2:
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the same mechanism constructed in Step 1 in Proposition
4. Although the Markov property is violated, the result follows from essentially the same steps
as in the proof of Proposition 4 by noting that the buyer￿ s value function (and hence his optimal
behavior) in any period t ￿ 2 depend only on the buyer￿ s type in period one, on what he reported
in period one, and on the shock experienced in period t. The mechanism constructed in Step 1 in
Proposition 4 then guarantees that a buyer who lied in period one will lie again at any subsequent
period by reporting a shock ^ ￿t = ^ ￿t(￿1;￿2;:::;￿t;^ ￿1;^ ￿2;:::;^ ￿t￿1) de￿ned by
zt(￿1;￿t) = zt(^ ￿1;^ ￿t)
31On the contrary, a buyer who reported truthfully in period one and who lies in period t; will report
truthfully from period t+1 thereafter. Following the same arguments as in the Proof of Proposition
4 it is then easy to see that when the schedules qt(￿) of Proposition 3 satisfy the conditions of Part
(i) in the Proposition then the buyer ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully at any point in time.
Finally, following the same steps as in the Proof of Proposition 5 it is easy to see that when the
conditions of Part (ii) hold, the schedules qt(￿) of Proposition 3 satisfy the conditions of Part (i).
Proof of Lemma 3. The result follows from two simple observations. First, to minimize the
surplus the seller leaves to the buyer, it is optimal to make the participation constraint of the lowest
type ￿1
1 and all downward adjacent incentive compatibility constraints binding. Maximizing the
seller￿ s expected revenue subject to these constraints gives the schedules in the lemma. Next, note
that, because the schedules are monotonic in each argument, then the same monotone-comparative
statics results used to establish Lemma 1 guarantee that all other incentive-compatibility constraints
are satis￿ed. That all all types ￿nd it optimal to participate is immediate.
Proof of Proposition 7.
The proof is in two steps and parallels that of Proposition 4. Step 1 constructs a pro￿le
of transfers that, along with the schedules of Lemma 3￿ extended over the enlarged state space
￿￿ ~ ￿T￿ gives the buyer the same expected payo⁄ as the solution to the relaxed program (and, by
implication, the seller the same expected pro￿ts). Step 2, shows that the mechanism constructed
in Step 1 has the following properties: a buyer who reported truthfully up to period t ￿ 1 ￿nds it
optimal to participate in the seller￿ s mechanism in period t and (weakly) prefers to report truthfully
from period t onward rather than lying in period t and then choosing optimally what to report in any
subsequent period. Together, these properties guarantee that the schedules that solve the relaxed
program coincide with the optimal ones.
Step 1. Let qt(￿1;￿t) denote the quantity schedules of Lemma 3, extended over the enlarged state
space ￿ ￿ ~ ￿T: Next, consider the following transfers￿ again de￿ned over the enlarged state space
￿￿~ ￿t. Starting from period T and proceeding backward, the transfers pt(￿1;￿t) are constructed so
that, for any (￿1;￿t￿1;￿t) 2 ￿￿ ~ ￿t, a buyer who reported (￿1;￿t￿1) in the past and whose period-t
valuation is vt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t) is indi⁄erent between reporting truthfully from period t onward and lying
in period t by reporting a shock immediately below the true shock ￿t and then reporting truthfully
thereafter. That is, the transfers pt(￿1;￿t) are constructed so that all downward adjacent local
incentive-compatibility constraints bind. In addition, the transfers pt(￿1;￿t) satisfy the property
that, after any (￿1;￿t￿1) 2 ￿ ￿ ~ ￿t￿1; type vt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿
t
) obtains a zero expected continuation
payo⁄.
32Step 2. Now consider the buyer￿ s incentives in period t after he has reported truthfully in all
preceding periods. By construction, the transfers of Step 1 guarantee that the buyer is indi⁄erent
between reporting truthfully from period t onward and lying in period t by reporting a shock
immediately below the true one and then reporting truthfully thereafter. I now want to show
that, when the schedules of the relaxed program of Lemma 3 satisfy the monotonicity properties
of Condition (2) and the overlapping condition holds, then the transfers of Step 1 also guarantee
that the buyer prefers to report truthfully from period t onward rather than lying in period t and
then choosing optimally what to report at any subsequent period.
First note that a buyer who reported truthfully up to period T ￿ 1 ￿nds it optimal to report
truthfully also in period T: This follows directly from Lemma 1 along with the fact that all downward
adjacent incentive-compatibility constraints bind. The rest of the proof is establish by induction.
Suppose the mechanism is incentive-compatible (on the equilibrium path) from period t+1 onward.
As in the proof of Proposition 4, this implies that the best the buyer can do after reporting ^ ￿t 6= ￿t
in period t is to report a shock ^ ￿
￿
t+1 = ^ ￿
￿
t+1(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1;￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t) in period t + 1 implicitly
de￿ned by
vt+1(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1) = vt+1(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t;^ ￿
￿
t+1)
and then reporting truthfully in all subsequent periods. The continuation payo⁄ the buyer obtains
by reporting ^ ￿t in period t is thus equal to
^ Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t) (42)
= Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t) +
h







t+1(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿t+1;￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t)) ￿ Ut+1(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t;￿t+1)
i
On the contrary, the continuation payo⁄ the buyer obtains by reporting the shock ￿t truthfully in
period t is Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t): Now, suppose ^ ￿t < ￿t and, for any ^ ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t < ￿t, any s ￿ t, and any
(￿t+1;::;￿s), let
￿vs;t(￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿t;￿t+1;::;￿s) ￿ vs(￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿
+
t ;￿t+1;::;￿s) ￿ vt(￿1;￿t￿1;~ ￿t;￿t+1;::;￿s)
where ~ ￿
+
t > ~ ￿t denotes the (upward) shock adjacent to ~ ￿t while ~ ￿
￿
t < ~ ￿t denotes the (downward)
33shock adjacent to ~ ￿t. The construction of the transfers in Step 1 then implies that









































￿s￿t￿1￿vs;t+1(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t;~ ￿t+1;￿t+2;::;￿s)qs(￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t;~ ￿t+1;￿t+2;::;￿s)
￿￿
Combining (42) with (43) and using the strong monotonicity property of the quantity schedules,
we then have that, when the overlapping condition holds,
Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t) ￿ ^ Ut(￿1;￿t￿1;￿t;￿1;￿t￿1;^ ￿t): (44)
Similar steps permit us to establish that a buyer who reported truthfully up to period t￿1 prefers
to report truthfully from period t onward rather than reporting any shock ^ ￿t > ￿t in period t and
then choosing optimally what to report thereafter.
Finally, that a buyer who reported truthfully in the past ￿nds it optimal to participate in
the seller￿ s mechanism at any subsequent date follows directly from the fact that the transfers
constructed in Step 1 are such that the type vt(￿1;￿t￿1;￿
t
) obtains a zero expected continuation
payo⁄.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let Ft(￿t;￿1;:::;￿t￿1) denote the conditional distribution of ￿t given
￿1;:::;￿t￿1. The result is established by induction applying the probability integral transform theo-
rem (e.g. Angus, 1994).
Start with t = 2: Let ￿2 be the random variable de￿ned by ￿2(￿2;￿1) ￿ F2(￿2;￿1): By the
probability integral transform theorem, irrespective of ￿1; ￿2 is uniformly distributed over (0;1);
which implies that ￿2 is independent of ￿1: The result for t = 2 thus holds by letting ￿2 ￿ F2(￿2;￿1)
and ￿2 = v2(￿1;￿2) ￿ F￿1
2 (￿2;￿1):
Now, by induction, suppose the result holds for all periods s < t: I want to show that it holds
also for period t. First note that the same arguments used for t = 2 imply that there exists a
34function ut and a random variable ￿t such that ￿t = ut(￿1;:::;￿t￿1;￿t) with ￿t(￿t;￿1;:::;￿t￿1) ￿
Ft(￿t;￿1;:::;￿t￿1), ut ￿ F￿1
t (￿t;￿1;:::;￿t￿1) and ￿t independent of ￿1;:::;￿t￿1: The fact that each
￿s can be represented as vs(￿1;￿s), s ￿ t￿1; then implies that there exists a function vt : Rt ￿! R
such that ￿t can be represented as
￿t = vt(￿1;￿t) ￿ F￿1
t (￿t;￿1;v2(￿1;￿2);:::;vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1))
Furthermore, because for each (￿1;￿t￿1); ￿t ￿ Ft(￿t;v2(￿1;￿2);:::;vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1)) is uniformly dis-
tributed over (0;1); then ￿t is independent of (￿1;￿t￿1): I conclude that (￿1;￿T) are jointly inde-
pendent.
Proof of Proposition 9. Part (i). Using the same transformation as in the proof of Proposition
8 adjusted to the fact that ￿t follows a Markov process, we have that ￿t can be represented as
￿t = vt(￿1;￿t) ￿ F￿1
t (￿t;vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1))
with ￿t ￿ Ft(￿t;vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1)):
The fact that Ft(￿t;￿t￿1) is continuous and strictly increasing in ￿t and strictly decreasing in
￿t￿1 then implies that F￿1
t is strictly increasing in both ￿t and vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1). When t = 2; this
immediately implies that v2(￿1;￿2) is increasing in both arguments. The result for any t > 2 then
follows by induction.
Part (ii). I now want to show that, if the process for ￿t satis￿es the conditions in part (i) in
the proposition, then any pair of collections (vt;￿t)T
t=2 and (~ vt;~ ￿)T









for any (￿1;￿t) and (￿1;~ ￿
t
) such that ~ vs(￿1;~ ￿
s
) = vs(￿1;￿s) for any s ￿ t. Because the process is
Markov, there exist functions (ut)
T
t=2 and (~ ut)
T
t=2 such that, for any t;
vt(￿1;￿t) = ut(vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1);￿t) and ~ vt(￿1;~ ￿
t
) = ~ ut(~ vt￿1(￿1;~ ￿
t￿1
);~ ￿t) (45)
with ut and ~ ut strictly increasing in ￿t and ~ ￿t, respectively. Now take any (￿t￿1;￿t) and let ~ ￿t =


















I now want to show that ~ ￿t(￿t￿1;￿t) does not depend on ￿t￿1: Indeed, suppose this is not the case.
Take a pair (￿t￿1;￿0
t). Then
Pr(￿t ￿ ￿0
t) = Pr(￿t ￿ ut(￿t￿1;￿0
t) j ￿t￿1) = Pr(￿t ￿ ~ ut(￿t￿1;~ ￿t(￿t￿1;￿0
t)) j ￿t￿1) = Pr(~ ￿t ￿ ~ ￿t(￿t￿1;￿0
t)):
(47)
Now take a pair (￿0
t￿1;￿0
t) with ￿0
t￿1 6= ￿t￿1: Then
Pr(￿t ￿ ￿0
t) = Pr(￿t ￿ ut(￿0
t￿1;￿0
t) j ￿0








Combining (47) and (48) and using the fact that the random variable ~ ￿t does not have mass
points, we have that necessarily ~ ￿t(￿t￿1;￿0
t) = ~ ￿t(￿0
t￿1;￿0
t); that is, the function ~ ￿t(￿) is independent
of ￿t￿1 in which case (46) holds.




























for any (￿1;￿t) and (￿1;￿t) such that ~ vs(￿1;~ ￿
s
) = vs(￿1;￿s) for any s ￿ t; which proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 10. The fact that the functions Ft satisfy the properties of Propositions 8
and 9 implies that there exist twice di⁄erentiable functions ut : R2 ￿! R such that, for any t ￿ 2;
vt(￿1;￿t) = ut(vt￿1(￿1;￿t￿1);￿t) = ut(￿t￿1;￿t) (49)
From Lemma 2 in Eso and Szentes (2007) the condition that [@Ft(￿t;￿t￿1)=@￿t￿1]=[ft(￿t;￿t￿1)] is
increasing in ￿t is equivalent to the condition that
@2ut(￿t￿1;￿t)
@￿t￿1@￿t
￿ 0 8(￿1;￿t); t ￿ 2: (50)





























￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
@v2(￿1;￿2)
@￿1
Conditions (52) and (50) along with the fact that both vs and us are strictly increasing in each
argument then implies that vt(￿1;￿t) is concave in ￿1 and that
@2vt(￿1;￿t)
@￿1@￿s
￿ 0 8(￿1;￿t); s ￿ t:
That is, the two conditions about the conditional distributions Ft(￿t;￿t￿1) stated in the proposition
imply that the corresponding functions vt satisfy the properties of part (i) in Proposition 5.
Next, I want to show that the same conditions imply that the corresponding functions vs are










That this is true can be seen directly from (53).
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